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The Importance of Magic in the Origins of Modern Science 
Isaac Newton’s interest in alchemy is now well known, but attempts to deny that 
Newton could ever have been influenced by occult traditions are still a prominent 
feature of scholarly efforts to understand the man and his work.
1
 A number of 
philosophers of science have recently insisted, for example, that Newton did not, 
indeed could not, believe that action at a distance was possible.
2
 Whatever 
philosophers of science might wish to believe, however, the historical reality is 
perfectly clear. Newton took up the notion of action at a distance, an idea which had 
previously been excluded from natural philosophy but which flourished in occult 
traditions, and made it one of the corner stones of his physics (manifested most 
obviously in his concept of gravity, but also in the micro-matter theory discussed in 
the “Queries” appended to the Opticks).3 Furthermore, due to his influence, the history 
of eighteenth-century natural philosophy, especially in Britain, can be seen in terms of 
those who accept the Newtonian claim that all phenomena can be explained in terms 
of attractive and repulsive forces operating at a distance (albeit microscopically small 
distances) between particles, or in terms of those who accept Newton’s idea that all 
phenomena might be explained by a highly rarefied yet highly transmissive aether—
an aether constituted of particles widely separated as a result of strong repulsive 
forces operating at a distance between the particles.
4
 Newton almost single-handedly 
reversed the assumption (dominant since Aristotle) that “a thing cannot act where it is 
not”, and made action at a distance a perfectly acceptable concept of physics. As John 
Stuart Mill wrote in his System of Logic of 1843,“ the ancient maxim that a thing 
cannot act where it is not… probably is not now believed by any educated person in 
Europe.”5 
It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that historians of 
science began to recognize the more magical aspects of Newton’s work. The result of 
this on-going research is to acknowledge Newton as the “last of the magicians”, the 
“last wonder child to whom the Magi could do sincere and appropriate homage”.6 
There can be little doubt that he was the last, or among the last. By the time of 
Newton’s death in 1727, the new reformed natural philosophy, which began to 
emerge in the sixteenth century and which had found its first programmatist in Francis 
Bacon, was sufficiently well established that its Enlightenment promoters saw it as sui 
generis, and felt no need to acknowledge its parentage. But Newton was by no means 
the only natural philosopher who had drawn upon magical traditions. Indeed, 
Newton's own interest in various magical traditions can best be understood by 
locating it within a late-Renaissance movement to reform natural philosophy by 
paying closer attention to various magical or occult traditions.
7
  
 
Although it is now (at last) diminishing, there is still enormous resistance among the 
more positivist philosophers and historians of science to any suggestion that magic 
might have been instrumental in the emergence of modern science. It is remarkable, 
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for example, that the authors of two recent books on the role of alchemy in the 
Scientific Revolution, one introductory the other advanced, both felt the need to 
justify the claims they were making on behalf of alchemy because of its “associations 
with magic and the occult”.8  For the most part, the arguments against the possible 
influence of magic on science are presented a priori, while the historical evidence is 
simply ignored. So, magic is characterized as irrational and its influence upon a 
supremely rational pursuit like modern science is easily dismissed as inherently 
implausible. Similarly, magic is said to be concerned with the supernatural and 
therefore could only be antithetical to mankind’s heroic intellectual endeavour to 
explain phenomena in entirely naturalistic terms.
9
 What is particularly unfortunate 
about this approach is that, by dismissing magic at the outset, it fails to put any effort 
into understanding the nature and significance of magic in the pre-modern and early 
modern periods. But this ahistorical approach is intellectual chauvinism of the most 
arrogant kind, and the result is undoubtedly a diminishing of our understanding of the 
origins of modern science. To carry on in this vein is to repeat the errors of Sir David 
Brewster, Isaac Newton’s first biographer. Taking the opportunity to scrutinize 
Newton’s manuscript remains, Brewster soon came across the huge mass of 
alchemical manuscripts. His appalled response is well known: 
we cannot understand how a mind of such power, and so nobly occupied with 
the abstractions of geometry, and the study of the material world, could stoop 
to be even the copyist of the most contemptible alchemical poetry, and the 
annotator of a work, the obvious production of a fool and a knave.
10
 
When seen in the light of Brewster’s overwhelming admiration for Newton this is 
highly significant. An observer might have expected that Brewster would be led by 
his otherwise slavish veneration for his great forebear to conclude that, if Newton was 
so interested in alchemy, then there must have been something in it. But no, evidently 
Brewster’s conviction that alchemy was worthless rubbish outweighed even his awe 
of Newton’s genius. From a historically sensitive perspective, however, it should be 
assumed that if many of the leading figures in the Scientific Revolution (undoubtedly 
among the leading thinkers of their age) drew upon magical traditions it is our job as 
historians to try to recover what it was that they saw in those traditions. In the process, 
we will not only learn more about the nature of magic in the early modern period, but 
also about the origins of modern science. 
Indeed, it seems perfectly clear that something recognizably like modern 
science first emerged as a direct result of the absorption of various aspects of the 
magical tradition into traditional contemplative natural philosophy. Both the 
experimental method, and the concern that knowledge of the natural world should be 
put to use for the benefit of mankind, can be seen to have been long-established 
aspects of the magical tradition which came increasingly to be embraced by students 
of nature, who thereby turned traditional natural philosophy into one or other of the 
so-called new philosophies of the early modern period. It hardly seems necessary to 
repeat the arguments in support of these claims about the methodology of the new 
science. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing more to be said. Even the 
substantive content of natural philosophy—not just its methodology—was expanded 
by absorbing beliefs from the magical tradition. It is evident that some aspects of the 
magical tradition were recognized by early modern thinkers as useful, and by 
implication, valid or true, while other aspects of the tradition were either ignored or 
rejected, and were by implication held to be invalid or false. The main aim of this 
article is to suggest that this was the general fate of the magical tradition. Some 
aspects of the tradition were taken up by practitioners and became absorbed into 
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reformed versions of natural philosophy, while other aspects of the tradition were 
rejected. 
If it is true that major aspects of the magical tradition became absorbed into 
what we might call (if we are allowed a bit of anachronistic leeway) modern science, 
then this has implications for claims that have been made about a perceived decline of 
magic at the end of the seventeenth century. The ‘decline’ in question, of course, is 
the decline of magic as a topic for serious scholarly investigation and discussion. 
While magical ideas continued to flourish in popular culture, they declined 
dramatically among the highly educated elite, and came to be regarded as well beyond 
the intellectual pale. The reasons for this are undoubtedly manifold, and a number of 
reasons for the decline have already been discussed, most notably, of course, in Keith 
Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic.11 The aim of this paper is to suggest 
another major reason for the decline of magic; a reason which has not been discussed 
before, and which has significant implications for our understanding of early modern 
intellectual history. 
 
In the rest of this paper, therefore, I want to offer a new perspective to add to previous 
attempts to explain the so-called decline of magic. I suggest that a number of features 
of what were regarded as occult arts and sciences during the Renaissance and early 
modern periods, came to be appropriated by natural philosophers and so became 
absorbed into the new philosophies. To a large extent it was the in-put from magic 
that made the new innovatory philosophies what they were, not only with regard to 
the experimental method and the new ethos that natural knowledge should be 
pragmatically useful, but also with regard to their substantive content. At the same 
time, however, other aspects of the magical tradition were firmly rejected. These 
historical changes are perhaps best understood in terms of what sociologists of science 
have called ‘boundary work’, the process of demarcating supposed legitimate and 
valid procedures and presuppositions in establishing natural knowledge from those 
that are deemed invalid and illegitimate.
 12
 From the Renaissance through the period 
known as the Scientific Revolution there was a complete rearrangement of the 
boundaries of what was magic or occult and what was not, which in turn involved a 
redrawing of the boundaries which determined what was natural philosophy and what 
was not. Furthermore, it is my contention that this led to a decline in the fortunes 
(among orthodox thinkers at least) of what was left behind in the realms of magic.  
 My account also helps us to see, therefore, what is in fact a major historical 
and historiographical irony. The reason why positivistically-inclined commentators on 
the development of science have refused to acknowledge the relevance of magic to the 
history of science is because they mistake the rejected left-overs of the magical 
tradition—the pathetic rump of the tradition remaining after early modern natural 
philosophers had taken what they wanted from it—as the whole of the tradition. I said 
earlier that such historians, like Brewster confronted with Newton’s alchemy, refuse 
to make any attempt to understand the nature of the magical traditions. Just as 
Brewster, writing in the 1850s, knew the current reputation of alchemy and didn’t try 
to assess its reputation in Newton’s day, so certain modern commentators of science 
have relied upon their current understanding of what magic is (and by implication 
always has been), and have refused to accept the claims of other historians that magic 
was once so different that, properly understood, it is easy to see how it might have, 
and indeed did, influence the development of modern science. The currently 
prevailing conception of the magical tradition began to be forged in the eighteenth 
century and has continued into our own times.
13
 
John Henry  Page 4 of 20 
 
The Nature of ‘Magic’ 
One major reason for the prevailing mistaken conception (by positivist historians and 
others) of the nature of magic in the Renaissance is the lack of any understanding of 
what was known as natural magic. Lack of awareness of the natural magic tradition is 
due to the fact that it was to a large extent completely absorbed into what we now 
think of as science, while other, lesser, aspects of the tradition have remained in what 
should be regarded as merely a rump of the magical tradition—what was left over 
after parts of the tradition had been absorbed into natural philosophy. Today, we tend 
to identify magic with the supernatural (if we leave aside the stage trickery of ‘show-
business’ magic), but in the period we are looking at, to describe an event or a 
phenomenon as supernatural was to say that it had been brought about miraculously 
by God—only God was above nature, and only God could perform a supernatural 
act.
14
 Magic, by contrast, exploited the natural properties of things and the successful 
magician was believed to be highly knowledgeable about the different occult qualities 
of things. As Giovanni Battista Della Porta wrote: 
Magic is nothing else but the knowledge of the whole course of Nature... This 
Art, I say, is full of much vertue, of many secret mysteries; it openeth unto us 
the properties and qualities of hidden things, and the knowledge of the whole 
course of Nature; and it teacheth us by the agreement and the disagreement of 
things, either so to sunder them, or else to lay them so together by the mutual 
and fit applying of one thing to another, as thereby we do strange works, such 
as the vulgar sort call miracles... Wherefore, as many of you as come to behold 
Magick, must be persuaded that the works of Magick are nothing else but the 
works of Nature, whose dutiful hand-maid magick is.
15
 
This definition appears in the most popular textbook of magic of its day, simply titled 
Magia naturalis, but the same claims about the nature of magic are repeated time and 
again. Cornelius Agrippa, a leading Renaissance contributor to the magical tradition, 
insisted that “magicians are careful explorers of nature only directing what nature has 
formerly prepared, uniting actives to passives and often succeeding in anticipating 
results so that these things are popularly held to be miracles when they are really no 
more than anticipations of natural operations”.16 
 The major assumption of natural magic, then, was that all bodies have occult 
qualities which make them capable of acting upon other bodies in various ways, 
though in many cases the working of these occult qualities are supposed to be highly 
specific. The main method of putting magical knowledge to use, therefore, is to bring 
together a body known to have a specific action and the body upon which it is known 
to act, or else to separate such reactants for a negative effect. This is what Della Porta 
meant by sundering or laying together things in accordance with their “agreement and 
disagreement”, and what Agrippa meant by “uniting actives to passives”. This 
doctrine made a major impression on the great reformer of natural philosophy, Francis 
Bacon, who stated it in the fourth Aphorism of his influential New Organon: 
“Towards the effecting of works, all that man can do is put together or part asunder 
natural bodies. The rest is done by nature working within.”17 Such occult interactions 
were often described in terms of sympathies and antipathies between bodies, a 
notoriously magical way of talking which nevertheless was employed with minor 
changes by such leading exponents of the new philosophy as Robert Hooke, who 
spoke of congruities and incongruities between bodies, and Isaac Newton, who 
explained certain chemical phenomena in terms of principles of sociability and 
unsociability.
18
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 When compared with natural magic other aspects of the tradition, aspects 
which today are all too often held to be characterizing features of magic, were 
distinctly subordinate. The truly learned magus was held to be a man with a vast 
knowledge of “how to effect things worthy of the highest admiration... by the mutual 
application of natural actives and passives”.19 The great magician, in other words, 
knew by experience many of the operations of the occult qualities of things and knew 
how to put that knowledge to use. Lesser magicians, however, might have to resort to 
one or other of two alternative aspects of the tradition, as a substitute for their lack of 
knowledge. Both of these aspects of the magical tradition were seen as means of 
cutting corners, or of taking a short cut, to the knowledge of the occult qualities which 
the real magus would learn by experience (in principle at least—though in practice 
more usually by relying on magical lore, increasingly printed magical lore).
 20
  
I am referring here to sorcery (which includes necromancy, theurgy, witchcraft 
and all other arts of summoning spiritual beings), and semeiology or symbolic magic 
(which relies upon the power of signs, words and other symbols, and includes 
numerology, gematria, spellbinding, incantation and so on). These are the very things 
which many think of today as definitive of magic, but this is largely thanks to the re-
drawing of boundaries which took place in the early modern period. In the pre-
modern period sorcery and symbolic magic were seen primarily as subordinate to 
natural magic. An important element of symbolic magic, for example, involved the 
reading of the ‘signatures’ of things. It was supposed that God, at the Creation, had 
left physical clues about the secret workings of things, these were the signatures. So, 
as one commentator wrote: “besides the manifest and occult qualities of plants, from 
which their uses may be inferred, [Nature] has marked those which are most useful to 
us with certain signs and characters”.21 God and Nature, after all, did nothing in vain, 
and so there must be a reason for every characteristic feature that a thing might have. 
A favourite example among historians is the walnut: crack open the shell and the flesh 
of the walnut can be seen to resemble the human brain sitting in the skull, being 
divided down the middle and having a surface made up of convolutions. What else 
could this be but a sign from God that the walnut bears some relationship to the 
human head or brain?  The usual assumption was that the signature indicated some 
curative power, and so walnuts were assumed to offer a cure, perhaps for headaches, 
or for mental disturbance. Needless to say, precise determination of the efficacy of 
walnuts would require empirical research of a trial and error kind. In this respect at 
least, then, knowledge of symbolic magic, or an ability to read the signatures of 
things, can be seen as a short-cut to the knowledge of occult qualities required by the 
natural magician.
22
  
The link between natural magic and the signatures of things is easy to see, but 
to link sorcery to natural magic seems, on the face of it, bizarre in the extreme. 
Surprising though it may seem, however, sorcery too was seen as little more than a 
way of avoiding the painstaking gathering of knowledge of occult qualities from 
experience. If we wish to understand this we must once again be aware of the shift in 
meaning of the notion of the ‘supernatural’. From our perspective it seems a 
reasonable assumption that for pre-modern thinkers demons were capable of 
performing supernatural acts to bring about some miraculous event. This fits our 
assumptions about demons. Our assumptions, however, are historically misguided. It 
is something of an irony that present-day notions of demons with comic-book 
superpowers are the products of secular imaginations. In the pre-modern and early 
modern intellectual cosmology only God could do supernatural things. Demons, even 
the Devil himself, were God's creatures and as such were subject to natural law just 
John Henry  Page 6 of 20 
like the rest of us.
23
 As John Cotta wrote in The triall of witch-craft (1616): “Nature is 
nothing else but the ordinary power of God in all things created, among which the 
Divell being a creature, is contained, and therefore subject to that universal power”.24 
In so far as the Devil could perform marvelous feats it was only by virtue of the fact 
that he was a consummate natural magician. The Devil knew the occult qualities of 
things, and how to apply appropriate actives to passives to accomplish whatever might 
be required. William Perkins put it rather well in his Discourse of the damned art of 
witch-craft (1618): 
[The Devil has] exquisite knowledge of all natural things, as of the influences 
of the starres, the constitutions of men and other creatures, the kinds, vertues, 
and operation of plantes, rootes, hearbes, stones etc., which knowledge of his 
goeth many degrees beyond the skill of all men, yea even those that are most 
excellent in this kind, as Philosophers and Physicians are.
25
 
Accordingly, if a would-be practitioner of natural magic was at a loss about how to 
accomplish a particular outcome he might decide to summon a demon, or even the 
Devil himself. It is important to note, however, that if the Devil did succeed in 
performing what the magus wanted it would be because, as William Perkins wrote: 
in nature there be some properties, causes, and effects... most familiar unto 
him [the Devil], because in themselves they be no wonders, but only mysteries 
and secrets, the vertue and effect whereof he hath sometime observed since his 
creation.
26
 
The Devil, in other words, does these things in the same way that the natural magician 
does, but with greater success because of his greater experience—the Devil, after all, 
has been around for a very long time. The vulgar might think that the Devil and the 
magus are capable of producing miracles, but, as Cornelius Agrippa insisted, both 
merely anticipate and exploit natural operations.
27
 “Demons operate nothing”, wrote 
Francesco Giuntini, “except by natural application of active forces to the appropriate 
and proportionate passive objects, which is the work of nature.”28 The Devil has no 
supernatural power, he accomplishes his ends by exploiting the occult powers of 
nature. 
 So, although the logic of symbolic magic and the logic of demonology were 
closely linked to the logic of natural magic in the pre-modern period, by the end of the 
sixteenth century a re-alignment was under way. By the end of the seventeenth 
century major aspects of the natural magic tradition had been appropriated by the new 
philosophies or redefined in order to fit more easily with the new kinds of naturalism. 
But Symbolic magic, demonology and some aspects of natural magic, such as 
astrology, and the chrysopoeic aspects of alchemy, were left aside in what was 
effectively a new, differently defined, category of magic. This new category was now 
seen by the learned as merely bogus and invalid knowledge—as indeed it was, 
because the useful aspects, such as the notion that forces could operate at a distance, 
had all been absorbed into mainstream natural philosophy. 
 
An important aspect of the re-designation of natural magic as a set of assumptions that 
could be more fruitfully exploited in natural philosophy was, effectively, a denial that 
natural magic was magic. Thanks principally to the power of the Church, magic had 
always had what today would be called a ‘bad press’. As if the escapades of frauds 
and charlatans claiming to be alchemists, astrologers, and magicians were not enough 
to damage the reputation of magic, the Roman Catholic Church tended to emphasize 
its demonological aspects in order to present it as dangerous and irreligious. It seems 
clear that the Church wanted to avoid confusion between the miraculous and the kind 
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of marvellous things which were achievable through natural though occult means. 
Natural magic seemed to suggest, to the uneducated at least, that miraculous things 
could be accomplished by laymen without supernatural aid. This implicit threat to the 
authority of the Church could be neatly turned around by insisting that all magic was 
accomplished by demonic aid, and so condemning it in the most vigorous terms. For 
the Church, every magus was a Doctor Faustus (and during the witch-crazes every 
village ‘cunning man’ or more especially ‘cunning woman’ was accused of deriving 
their knowledge not from natural lore but directly from Satan).
29
  
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that although we come across many reputed 
magicians in the historical record, we do not come across many who declare 
themselves to be magicians; on the contrary, they usually deny it. Nobody was reputed 
a greater magician than Roger Bacon and yet Bacon himself vigorously denied that he 
did anything by magic. If we were to take Bacon, and other magicians in denial, at 
their word, however, we might have to conclude that there was no such thing as a 
magical tradition, and that nobody ever was a magician. In a sense the latter is true, 
because there never was a Merlin, or a Faust, there were only mathematicians, 
alchemists, cabbalists, natural philosophers of a more mystical bent than usual, 
humanist scholars enthralled by Neoplatonic theurgy, and so forth.
30
 But we need to 
bear in mind the historical actors’ categories, not our own. From the point of view of 
his contemporaries, Roger Bacon was, as George Molland has pointed out, “a full-
blooded magician”, and in Molland’s estimation this was hardly surprising since, in 
spite of his protestations to the contrary, Bacon “went some way to meriting his later 
classification as a magician”.31   
As a result of religious condemnation of magic, then, it wasn’t possible simply 
to appropriate occult traditions in an open way into natural philosophy. Accordingly, 
an important aspect of the absorption of natural magic into reformed versions of 
natural philosophy was the defense of those past thinkers who were alleged to be 
magicians from all charges that they were magicians. Again, as George Molland has 
pointed out, reputed medieval magicians like Al-Kindi, Albertus Magnus, Roger 
Bacon, Arnald of Villanova and Michael Scot were transformed in early modern 
scholarly literature from magicians into heroes of experimental science. The major 
contribution to this new enterprise was Gabriel Naudé’s Apologie pour tous les 
Grands Personages qui ont esté faussement soupçonnez de Magie (Paris, 1625), but 
John Dee, evidently defended Roger Bacon, in a work now lost, from charges of 
sorcery.
32
 Similarly, Robert Hooke later took it upon himself to defend Dee. Having 
acquired increased notoriety from a newly published account of his supposed 
converse with various angels, Dee was defended by Hooke as a cryptographer rather 
than a sorcerer. According to Hooke, these angelic conversations were in fact a 
“concealed History of Nature and Art”. In taking this line, Hooke was simply re-using 
the same defense which had been used to protect the reputation of Johannes 
Trithemius—another magus who reported his conversations with angels, but which 
were later claimed to be merely exercises in cryptography (the point of the exercises 
being to find what was really being said under the guise of these conversations with 
angels).
 33
  
Other exploiters of the magical tradition chose to obscure their indebtedness to 
the tradition, or to confuse contemporaries as to their commitment to magic. Francis 
Bacon vigorously criticized magic even as he appropriated many of its precepts and 
doctrines.
34
 Cornelius Agrippa made the status of his De occulta philosophia 
(Cologne, 1533) somewhat ambiguous by publishing what looked like a retraction of 
it three years before publishing the work itself (although the supposed retraction, De 
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incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum, has recently been shown to be far from 
straightforward).
35
  
Neither silence about magical influence, nor even explicit denial of magic, 
should be taken as evidence that magical traditions did not play a role in the origins of 
modern science. Early modern thinkers re-constituted symbolic magic as beyond the 
intellectual pale, for example, while continuing to accept natural magic; others 
reasserted the untenability of sorcery (whether on sceptical or religious grounds
36
), 
while claiming other facets of the magical tradition as defining aspects of natural 
philosophy. Those positivistic historians and philosophers of science who have 
regarded magic as antithetical to science have made the mistake of neglecting such 
changes in what constituted magic. They have tended to assume that magic in the 
early modern period was essentially the same as what it became after the 
Enlightenment. In fact, the category of magic has changed radically. Chiefly because 
significant parts of the original tradition have been absorbed into natural philosophy, 
and redefined by the historical actors themselves (all too conscious of religious 
opposition to magic) as though they were always aspects of natural philosophy or 
other legitimate attempts to understand the natural world.
37
 I disagree, therefore, with 
the suggestion of Frank L. Borchardt that, sooner or later, magicians themselves 
expressed a “disappointment in magic”, recognising that it led inexorably to 
demonolatry, and repudiated it as they all turned back to religious orthodoxy. It seems 
to me that the story is rather one of negotiating with the faith, their own as much as 
that of leading Churchmen, and appropriating certain aspects of magic into their own 
philosophical systems, while leaving the more religiously dangerous aspects to remain 
in what became an increasingly demonologically defined (as opposed to the former 
more naturally defined) magic.
38
 One of the major reasons why the influence of 
magic on science (if we can speak anachronistically for the sake of a historiographical 
argument) has been denied is precisely because those aspects of magic which clearly 
did influence science are now simply regarded as part of the history of science, and so 
no longer recognized to be part of the history of magic. Meanwhile, those aspects of 
magic which were not absorbed into science, and to a large extent were seen in the 
early modern period as antithetical to a proper understanding of natural phenomena, 
have come to be regarded as entirely representative of magic, not just as it was after 
the end of the seventeenth century, but as it was throughout the whole of its career 
through Western culture. This is simply a very misleading mistake. 
 
The Selective Absorption of Aspects of the Magical Tradition 
The foregoing should not be taken to mean that natural philosophers simply decided 
in a deliberate way to look into the magical tradition to see if there was anything they 
could incorporate into their natural philosophies. This was no more the case than that 
natural philosophers in the sixteenth century deliberately decided to go and see what 
artisans and craftsmen were doing, on the chance there might be something they could 
use. Nevertheless, it is just as true to say that natural philosophers began to become 
more and more familiar with occult arts and sciences as it is to say that scholars and 
craftsmen began to interact during the Renaissance as they never had before.
39
 In 
some cases, of course, reformers did extol the deliberate appropriation of knowledge 
from craft or magical traditions, and no doubt some of their readers did follow suit. 
Certainly, Juan Luis Vives did urge his scholarly readers in 1531 “to enter into shops 
and factories, and to ask questions from craftsmen, and to get to know about the 
details of their work”; and Francis Bacon urged readers of his Novum organum (1620) 
to systematically search through magical lore,  
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for although such things lie buried deep beneath a mass of falsehood and fable, 
yet they should be looked into… for it may be that in some of them natural 
operations lie at the bottom; as in fascination, strengthening of the 
imagination, sympathy of things at a distance, transmission of impressions 
from spirit to spirit no less than from body to body and the like.
40
  
For the most part, however, what we are dealing with is a diffuse movement, 
throughout Europe and spread over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of 
thinkers adopting, or adapting, theories, assumptions, and techniques which 
previously would have been seen as too occult or too susceptible to the charge of 
being demonic, into what came to be accepted as the new philosophy. Again, different 
aspects of this diffuse movement, need to be understood differently. William Gilbert, 
who developed an explanation of the perpetual movement of the Earth (demanded by 
Copernican theory) based on the occult properties of magnets, may not have been 
looking for a way to explain the motion of the Earth, but realized he could offer an 
explanation after reading Pierre de Maricourt’s Epistle on the Magnet. Robert Boyle 
did not turn to alchemy as a result of his dissatisfaction with Cartesian mechanical 
philosophy—he already was an alchemist, and may well have recognized 
inadequacies in Cartesianism precisely because of his alchemical knowledge.
41
 In lots 
of different ways magical ideas became incorporated into the mainstream of 
philosophical thought, but only in a few cases was this the result of a self-conscious 
effort to plunder magical traditions. 
The precise way in which different areas of the occult arts and sciences were 
taken up by natural philosophers can be seen, therefore, to be complex and affected by 
many historical contingencies. It is not possible to provide a model which reveals how 
the occult was absorbed into mainstream philosophy because each case was very 
different. The process was not systematic, and may not even have been fully 
comprehensive, embracing every aspect of the occult, but it was undeniably extensive. 
What follows in this section is not intended to be a complete account, but merely a 
preliminary attempt to show how aspects of at least some of the occult sciences came 
to be incorporated into the new philosophies of the early modern period, while others 
were considered for inclusion but ultimately rejected. 
So-called mathematical magic, for example, was concerned with the 
demonstration of what could be accomplished by machinery. Machines, after all, were 
intended to perform marvellous feats which could not be done by normal means, and 
they did so in ways that were by no means manifest to a casual observer. Their 
operations were, therefore, by definition occult. In part this can be seen as an example 
of Arthur C. Clarke’s ‘law’, that “any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic”. But it would be a mistake to assume that this meant 
that Renaissance thinkers believed that machinery was worked by hidden demons.
42
 
The ill-educated were superstitious, of course, and sometimes might well have 
thought this way, but among the educated it was perfectly well known that machines 
worked by means of cunningly arranged mechanical contrivances. Consider, for 
example, Salluste du Bartas’s description of the “iron fly”, allegedly built by the 
mathematician Regiomontanus and capable of flying around a room:  
O devine wit, that in the narrow wombe 
Of a small Flie, could finde sufficient roome 
For all those springs, wheels, counterpoise, & chaines, 
Which stood in stead of life, and spurre, and raines.
43
 
This iron fly would still have been held to work by occult means. Because the 
mechanical arrangements which “stood in stead of life” were hidden, and their mode 
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of operation was not obvious to the senses, and moreover could not be explained in 
the terms of Aristotelian natural philosophy, they were regarded as occult powers, 
analogous to the workings of occult qualities in natural bodies.
44
  
 The mathematisation of the world picture has always been regarded as an 
important element in the Scientific Revolution, but scholarly analysis of this crucial 
historical process has failed to pay sufficient attention to the undeniable associations 
between mathematics and magic in the Renaissance. Historians of mathematics have 
looked to humanists, astronomers, Jesuit mathematicians, and mathematical 
practitioners of the more pragmatic kind (artillerymen, surveyors, merchant book-
keepers, and engineers of various kinds), but have largely ignored those Renaissance 
intellectuals who were more concerned with the magic of mathematics.
45
 This is 
undoubtedly another result of the positivist tendencies among historians of science, 
tending to dismiss anything which smacks of magic. Where magical mathematics has 
been discussed it has been seen purely as an aspect of Renaissance culture, and its 
possible relevance to the subsequent development of mathematics is left 
unconsidered. J. Peter Zetterberg, for example, takes it for granted that there was 
something called ‘the mathematicks’ which was unfortunately all too often mistaken 
for magic. It evidently never occurred to him that mathematics could have been, as 
indeed it was, regarded by pre-modern thinkers as a major part of the magical 
tradition.
46
 As far as most pre-modern thinkers were concerned, to describe a man as a 
mathematician was to describe him as a wizard; this was certainly true, for example, 
in the cases of John Napier and John Dee.
47
 
 By the time John Wilkins, one of the major contributors to the new philosophy 
in England, came to publish his Mathematical magick (1648), he felt it necessary to 
apologize for the title. By now, educated men were getting used to the idea that 
mathematics had an important place in natural philosophy (something which had 
always been denied by Aristotle), and mechanics was increasingly being seen as a 
science which depended upon natural phenomena, and so the workings of machinery 
could be seen as part of natural philosophy, and could shake off its old association 
with magic.
48
 The process of incorporating mechanics into natural philosophy began 
with the Renaissance discovery of the Mechanical questions, attributed (wrongly) to 
Aristotle and first translated into Latin by Vittore Fausto in 1517. It required the re-
casting of mechanics from an art to one of the mixed mathematical sciences, before 
Descartes could insist, in 1644, that “there really are no reasonings in Mechanics 
which do not also pertain to Physics, of which it is a part or species.”49 Although 
historians of mathematics have tended to be even less interested in assessing the 
possible influence of occultism than historians of science have been, there seems to be 
a prima facie case for assuming that changing attitudes to mathematics, and changes 
in the intellectual status of mathematics, owed something to the reassessment of 
occult traditions which took place during the Renaissance.  
 The entirely undeniable role of alchemy in the development of modern science 
also needs to be understood in a carefully nuanced way. In an important article 
Lawrence Principe and William Newman have recently shown that our modern view 
of the nature of alchemy is severely distorted by various reconstructions of it which 
derive from nineteenth-century occultist movements, and have no real historical basis 
in the alchemy of the pre-modern period.
50
 The historiographical rot set in when 
Enlightenment thinkers drew a spurious distinction between chemistry, in something 
like the modern sense, and alchemy, which was presented as being concerned solely 
with transmutation of base metal into gold.
51
 This in itself can be seen as part of the 
trend, still active in the eighteenth century, to separate the new natural philosophy 
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from magic. The need for this kind of separation of alchemy from chemistry became 
even more urgent for later spokesmen on science because of the appropriation of 
alchemy by various nineteenth-century occultists.
52
 Newman and Principe are in the 
forefront of on-going efforts to recover the real history of alchemy from these 
obfuscations, and to show precisely how alchemy was absorbed into modern science, 
and what was left out (or, in this case, what came to be interpolated subsequently into 
a bogus history of alchemy invented by later occultists). In connection with this, 
Principe and Newman point out that not all alchemists subscribed to an animist, or 
even a vitalist, view of matter, and that such differences might have resulted in a 
different kind of take-up of alchemical ideas by reforming natural philosophers. 
Similarly, they point to recent work which has shown that alchemical matter theory 
was often corpuscularian, and even mechanistic, and which certainly played a part in 
the new matter theories of the Scientific Revolution.
53
 
 If alchemy was broken down into a general concern with chemical interactions 
and processes on the one hand and a concern with metallic transmutation on the other, 
and only the former made it into the new science, we can see a similar process with 
regard to the absorption of herbalism and the lore of Medieval bestiaries. Studies of 
flora and fauna in the pre-modern period were overlaid with assumptions about the 
religious, moral and symbolic significance of all God’s creatures, as well as their 
potential for providing materia medica. Many of these assumptions, in what historians 
have referred to as the “emblematic worldview”, derived from the belief in 
correspondences within the Great Chain of Being, and included various occult 
associations, based upon what were considered to be God-given signatures. As botany 
and zoology came to be included in the new science, however, much of this magical 
and mythological lore, once considered to provide essential information about the 
plant or animal in question, was excluded.  
To understand this change in attitude about knowledge of natural things, we 
need to consider the effect of the discovery of the new world. Plants and animals from 
the new world came to the West devoid of any symbolic associations—they had no 
religious or moral significance deriving from either historical and religious legends, or 
from humbler folklore. Naturalists had no choice but to confine themselves to known 
facts about this new flora and fauna. In subsequent compendiums of natural history, 
therefore, there was a clear shift towards treating all plants and animals in the same 
strictly descriptive way. Just as creatures unknown to European culture had to be 
recorded merely in terms of what could actually be observed, so the old folkloric 
associations were stripped away from familiar plants and animals. To a large extent 
this resulted in a less magical world picture, but it would be wrong to see this as a 
steady triumph of science over magic.
54
 
Belief in the occult qualities of those plants and animals used in materia 
medica, supposedly based upon past experience anyway, was not affected by this 
increased emphasis upon observation. Furthermore, the tendency of explorers was to 
bring back just those plants which were deemed by native populations to be most 
useful in curing disease. More often than not, European doctors could not decide how, 
or even whether, such unknown drugs worked on the four humours of the body. 
Without so much as an obiter dictum from Aristotle, or Dioscorides, or some other 
ancient authority, it was often impossible to tell whether a plant worked through heat, 
cold or one of the other manifest qualities. Increasingly, therefore, medical thinkers 
declared new drugs to work by means of the major alternative to the manifest 
qualities: occult qualities. This even led to a re-working of medical and therapeutic 
theory, in which some diseases were held to be the result not of an imbalance in the 
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humoral constitution, but a corruption of the whole substance of the body. The only 
drugs capable of curing these diseases were those that operated, likewise, on the ‘total 
substance’ of the body, not merely on a particular humor.55 The occult qualities of 
materia medica, as opposed to supposed manifest qualities of heat, cold, moistness 
and dryness, were increasingly recognized and accepted into the new natural 
philosophy.  
 
I believe it would be possible to continue in this vein, showing how different aspects 
of the magical tradition were partially taken up by natural philosophers, while other 
aspects were entirely excluded. In all cases, as with the examples briefly discussed 
here, the story will be one where the historical complexities derive from a host of 
contingencies. It is fairly obvious, for example, that the precise way in which 
alchemy, or part of it, became absorbed into natural philosophy was different from the 
way that so-called ‘mathematical magic’—the use of machinery to improve human 
faculties—was adopted.56 Furthermore, some prominent aspects of the natural magic 
tradition, such as a belief in the natural power of words, were not included within the 
new boundaries at all. In other cases, aspects of the tradition were only taken up in a 
very restricted sense, as in the case of numerology, which seems to have led Kepler 
and Newton, to cite two prominent examples, to draw specific conclusions about the 
natural world, but can hardly be said to have been a general influence.
57
 If we bear in 
mind, also, that the magical tradition was undoubtedly a major source for the 
experimentalism of the new philosophies, and for the idea that knowledge of the 
natural world should be useful for the benefit of mankind, it seems hard to deny the 
claim that the new philosophies were greatly indebted to the magical tradition.
58
 
 
Why the Change? 
The question arises, therefore, as to why this sea-change occurred. Why was the map 
of knowledge redrawn between the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of the 
Enlightenment? Why were the boundaries redefined so that natural magic lost its 
identity by becoming largely absorbed into the new ‘natural philosophy’ (which now, 
thanks to the experimental method, the integral use of mathematics, and the concern 
with pragmatism was closer to our modern concept of science than it was to the earlier 
tradition of contemplative natural philosophy), while symbolic magic came to be seen, 
by the educated at least, as superstitious nonsense,
59
 and demonology, formerly a 
borderline category linking religion and natural philosophy, became first of all an 
entirely religious category, and with increasing secularization was thoroughly 
rejected?
60
 
 As with so many other problems in history, the answers to this question are no 
doubt legion. We have already considered a few reasons along the way, such as the 
change in status of mathematics, helped by the discovery of the supposedly 
Aristotelian Quaestiones mechanicae, but it is beyond the scope of this article to 
survey all the other possible factors. It is clear, for example, that the full story could 
not be told without paying careful attention to the social and political context of 
Renaissance and Reformation Europe, and how developments in these spheres 
affected intellectual life.
61
 What I want to do here is simply to consider briefly some 
of the more immediate reasons why the boundaries of magic and natural philosophy 
were redrawn in just the way they were. By ‘immediate’ I mean those reasons which 
arose directly out of the efforts of Renaissance and early modern thinkers to improve 
their understanding of the natural world.  
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 Perhaps the first thing to mention in this connection was the change in the 
intellectual status of magic as a result of the discovery of the essentially religious 
writings attributed to Hermes Trismegistus. Thanks to a generally accepted belief in 
the wisdom of Adam, it was usually assumed in the pre-modern period that 
knowledge was something that needed to be recovered from the past. Adam knew all 
things, but thanks to the Fall, this wisdom had been successively forgotten. For the 
pre-moderns, therefore, thinkers of great antiquity were more likely to know more—to 
have forgotten less of the Adamic wisdom—than a contemporary thinker. This belief 
is most familiar to historians of science through the common designation of the 
Copernican theory as the Pythagorean theory.
62
 The Copernicans knew that if they 
were to have any chance of persuading their contemporaries of the truth of the 
Copernican theory they had to show that it had been believed in the past. The ancient 
sage, Hermes Trismegistus, was regarded as a contemporary of Moses, and he was 
seen to be responsible for transmitting the Adamic wisdom to the pagan Greeks, as 
Moses had transmitted it to the Jews. This belief was easy to sustain in the light of the 
fact that the newly discovered Hermetic writings showed clear foreshadowings of 
Christian belief, including its trinitarianism. As we now know, these supposed 
foreshadowings were in fact echoes of Christian belief, since these writings were 
actually compiled by Neoplatonists in the early centuries of the Christian era.  
 The first translator of the Hermetic Corpus (a substantial part of it, at least) 
was Marsilio Ficino who was clearly fascinated by Neoplatonic theurgical beliefs and 
who began to develop his own theory of what D. P. Walker called ‘spiritual magic’ in 
his De vita coelitus comparanda (1489). Ficino’s work proved immensely influential 
and helped to promote the view that Hermes Trismegistus was above all else a 
magician.
 63
 This identification of Hermes as a magus was helped by the fact that, as 
well as the Neoplatonic theistic writings attributed to him, there were also a 
considerable number of astrological, alchemical and natural magical texts also 
attributed to this great sage. Given the belief in Adamic wisdom, and the belief in the 
great antiquity of the Hermetic writings, magic came to be seen as one of the oldest 
forms of knowledge, and was therefore newly invested with great respectability. After 
centuries of being disparaged by the Church, magic came to be seen as a major aspect 
of Adamic wisdom. Accordingly, as Eugenio Garin has suggested, there was a brief 
time, shortly after the discovery of the Hermetic Corpus, when it was acceptable to be 
called a magus, and to acknowledge oneself to be a magus (remember, we have 
already seen that it was much more usual to deny that one was a magician).
64
 It is 
hardly surprising therefore that reforming natural philosophers of the Renaissance and 
early modern periods should look with fresh eyes at the magical tradition, and 
consider more seriously than before what it had to offer.
65
 
 Another reason why the boundaries of magic came to be redrawn arose from 
rapid developments in the understanding of earlier magical traditions as a result of the 
humanist scholarship of the Renaissance. In particular, the recovery of the works of 
Ancient Neoplatonists, such as Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblichus and others, revealed a 
theory of magic in which “spiritual and demonic magic” played a greater role than 
natural magic. This alternative to the Aristotelian tradition first became known as a 
result of the work of the famous Florentine philosopher and translator, Marsilio 
Ficino, whose De vita coelitus comparanda of 1489 was a full exposition of the 
theory of magic which drew not only upon Aristotelian traditions of occult qualities 
but also upon the more theurgical theorising of the later Neoplatonists. Although 
Ficino himself seems to have managed to stay within the confines of natural magic as 
it was traditionally conceived (with the emphasis on the natural), his exposition drew 
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attention to the fact that later Neoplatonists seemed to believe that occult qualities in 
matter were clear signs of divine or demonic presence within the matter. For the 
pagan Neoplatonists, in other words, the occult but natural effects discussed in 
traditional natural magic were, in fact, supernatural effects brought about directly by 
gods or demons. Although such ideas were pagan and could easily be shown not to fit 
in with Christian Aristotelianism, they ensured that the boundary demarcation 
between natural and supernatural and the abilities of demons were placed firmly on 
the agenda of scholarly discussions. In this way, occult qualities, formerly hardly 
discussed within the scholastic tradition, became important items for discussion.
66
 
 One of the most important of such discussions was that of the notorious 
secular Aristotelian philosopher, Pietro Pomponazzi. Pomponazzi was, as Brian 
Copenhaver has recently said, “entirely and aggressively naturalist” and in 1520 he 
wrote a treatise On the causes of marvelous natural effects and on spells, in which he 
explicitly intended to make demons redundant for any understanding of the natural 
world. One of his arguments was that, even if demons were capable of knowing better 
than men all the occult qualities of things and how to accomplish things by bringing 
together sympathetic actives and passives, because demons were spiritual, 
incorporeal, beings they were completely incapable of manipulating matter to 
accomplish anything by their knowledge.
67
 Once again, Pomponazzi's book, like 
Ficino's, stimulated debate about occult qualities, demons, and the demarcations 
between and around them. By rejecting the possibility of demonic intervention, 
Pomponazzi greatly expanded the role of the supposed occult qualities of matter. Such 
qualities could stimulate thinking about the nature of matter itself, and could 
subsequently be absorbed into the new natural philosophy. Meanwhile, sceptical 
philosophers had a new set of arguments for dismissing demons as ineffectual, and 
ultimately as nothing more than the result of superstitious beliefs.
68
 
 Another important stimulus towards a new and detailed consideration of occult 
qualities arose out of university medical faculties. We have already noted that 
developments in botany and other subjects affiliated to the production of materia 
medica resulted in increased numbers of new drugs being designated as “occult” in 
their operation, because their efficacy did not depend upon their effects upon the 
manifest qualities of the patients’ humours. This coincided with awareness of the need 
for reform of medical theory from another quarter. The increased prevalence of 
pestilential diseases in a Europe where bubonic plague was endemic and where 
syphilis was cutting a swathe through all classes of society presented problems for 
traditional medical theory. It was difficult to understand how a theory of disease based 
on individualistic humoural physiology could account for infectious plagues. 
Epidemic pestilences strongly suggest, contrary to ancient authority, that diseases 
have a kind of life of their own; they are real, distinct entities, which can pass from 
one person to another, or can simultaneously attack great numbers of people 
irrespective of their individual temperaments. A new understanding of the nature of 
diseases demands new ways of dealing with them, and the sixteenth century saw three 
major attempts to reform medical theory. The three would-be reformers, Paracelsus, 
Girolamo Fracastoro and Jean Fernel all drew upon occult traditions in their suggested 
reforms. Paracelsus looked to alchemy, not just as a way of producing new medicines, 
but as a way of understanding the nature of the physiology, and the nature of disease. 
Fracastoro developed the idea of “seeds” of disease, seminal principles capable of 
growing in the body and disrupting it, while Fernel believed that pestilences acted not 
on the humours, but on the substantial form of the body, which Fernel called the ‘total 
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substance’ of the body, and they did so, not by affecting the manifest qualities but by 
means of some occult power over the total substance.
69
 
The works of Ficino, Pomponazzi, Paracelsus, Fracastoro, and Fernel are, of 
course, just salient points in a rapidly changing landscape of intellectual discussion. 
Throughout the sixteenth century the nature and the role of occult qualities become 
increasingly prominent in natural philosophizing. This was bound to have unfortunate 
repercussions for traditional Aristotelianism, since, although occult qualities were 
allowed for in scholasticism, and traditional natural magic throughout the Middle 
Ages was loosely premised upon Aristotelian assumptions (alchemy, for example, 
although going far beyond anything to be found in Aristotle's writings still assumed 
the truth of the four elements and four qualities), in fact there was very little in 
Aristotle himself about occult qualities.
70
 Indeed, it became increasingly obvious 
during the Renaissance, when Aristotle came to be studied in the original Greek, that 
the natural magic tradition owed a great deal to medieval and Arabic interpolations, 
for example, from Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Avicenna, and Alkindi.
71
 More 
to the point, the ideal of science in the Aristotelian tradition was based on the form of 
the logical syllogism (deductive reasoning), but the premises, the starting points upon 
which the reasoning was based, had to be uncontentious, evident truths to which all 
could freely assent. Small wonder, therefore, that the main emphasis in natural 
philosophical argument was on the supposedly manifest qualities, which could fulfill 
the criteria of being undeniable and evident to all.
72
 It was one thing, within this 
system to occasionally have to resort to occult qualities in one's explanations; it was 
quite another, however, to see occult qualities playing an increasingly prominent role 
in a widespread range of natural phenomena. There was a real crisis in 
Aristotelianism, therefore, concerning the very possibility of dealing with insensible 
properties and entities in a philosophy that was supposedly grounded on human 
sensation. When writers like Pomponazzi, Jean Fernel, and Daniel Sennert can be 
seen to be elevating the role of occult qualities in Aristotelianism it seems legitimate 
to ask whether they are best seen as eclectic Aristotelians or as contributors to the 
demise of Aristotelianism. Whatever the truth of that, we cannot help but conclude, I 
think, that Renaissance developments in the notion of occult qualities resulted in a 
major re-arrangement, in which these qualities came to play a much greater role in 
reformed versions of natural philosophy, and eventually became absorbed into the 
mainstream of the new philosophies which completely displaced Aristotelianism.
73
 
 Finally, unlikely as it may seem to us (or to those of us who remain, like 
David Brewster, recalcitrant in their belief that all magic was merely the production of 
knaves and fools), there is every reason to suppose that, as far as Renaissance thinkers 
were concerned, the occult sciences were the most likely source for the reform of 
natural philosophy, and for the establishment of a true understanding of God’s 
Creation.  Indeed, to a large extent they were the only alternative sources of natural 
knowledge. Although occult qualities were generally assumed to be real, scholastic 
philosophers were always reluctant to have recourse to them; accordingly, these 
underexploited occult qualities seemed to offer the most likely source of help for 
would-be reformers of an increasingly moribund Aristotelian natural philosophy. 
When the Aristotelian theory of substantial forms, and the associated hylomorphic 
matter theory began increasingly to seem inadequate, natural philosophers turned to 
alchemy as a likely pointer to alternative ways of understanding the relationship 
between bodies and their properties.
74
 When Galenic medical theory, which relied 
almost exclusively on the balance (or imbalance) of the four qualities in the body for 
understanding disease and treating it, came to be seen as increasingly inadequate, 
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medical reformers like Fernel, Fracastoro, and the Paracelsians, all turned in one way 
or another to occult qualities as an alternative.
75
 Similarly, every one of the 
Renaissance thinkers who tried to develop new systems of philosophy, intended to 
completely replace Aristotelianism, relied to a large extent on aspects of the magical 
tradition. So much so, in fact, that each of these system-builders, can be seen as 
contributors themselves to the magical tradition.
76
 
This situation, in which would-be reformers of natural philosophy turned to 
the occult tradition as the most likely way out of all difficulties, continued even late 
into the seventeenth century, to the period seen as witnessing the dramatic decline of 
magic. Robert Boyle, recognizing the inadequacy of strict versions of the mechanical 
philosophy, including Cartesian claims that there were no new motions generated in 
nature, only transfers of motion from one part of the system to another via collisions, 
turned once again, as the opponents of Aristotelianism had before him, to alchemy. 
Newton, recognizing the absurdity of Cartesian vortex theory as an explanation for 
planetary movements and for gravity, preferred to rely instead upon the assumption 
that bodies could attract one another across vast distances of empty space.
77
 
The example set by Newton makes it hard to deny that, if reformers of natural 
philosophy believed the occult sciences offered the most likely source for a viable 
alternative to Aristotelianism, they were right. Descartes was proud of the fact that he 
had eschewed all occult qualities from his system, and so in a sense believed he had 
succeeded where Aristotelianism had failed (since it had never quite managed to 
dispose of occult qualities). But for many, the Cartesian system could be seen to be 
ultimately unworkable, and rather than eschewing occult qualities, they embraced 
them as the only realistic alternative.
78
 In so doing, occult qualities became absorbed 
into mainstream reformed natural philosophy. The triumph of Newtonianism, then, 
with its basic premise that all phenomena could be explained in terms of attractive and 
repulsive particles capable of acting at a distance, showed not only that Newton was 
right, but that earlier would-be reformers of natural philosophy who had tried to draw 
upon the magical tradition were not too far wrong. 
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